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Speedy Trial, Slow Implementation: The
ABA Standards in Search of a Statehouse
By JOHN W. PoULos* and JERRY P. COLBMAN**
On July 28, 1957, in a meadow beside the Thames, west of
London, between Staines and Windsor, the American Bar Association
dedicated a memorial to the Magna Carta.1 The Magna Carta was
exacted from King John at the old council ground called Runnymede
in June of 1215 by means which would have been called extortionate
if done by lesser men for lesser gain.2 Its fortieth article provided:
"To no one will we sell, to no one will we deny or delay right
or justice."
'3
More than 560 years after the Magna Carta was written, a virtually
uneducated Virginia planter with little legal training sat in his room in
Raleigh Tavern and wrote the first draft of what was to become the
Virginia Declaration of Rights.4 The eighth article of George Mason's
draft provided: "That in all capital or criminal prosecutions a man hath
a right to ... a speedy trial by an impartial jury of his vicinage. . .. "I
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University; J.D., 1962, University of California, Hastings College of the Law.
** A.B., 1974, Stanford University; member, third year class, School of Law,
University of California, Davis. The authors wish to acknowledge the assistance of
Nelson Roth, J.D., 1976, University of California, Davis, and Grant Tanner, member,
third year class, University of California, Davis.
This article was prepared as a report of the implementation of the ABA Speedy
Trial Standards for the Institute of Judicial Administration's Survey of the Impact of the
ABA Standards which, in turn, was supported by a grant from the Law Enforcement
Assistance Administration.
1. The Magna Carta Memorial Ceremonies: Runnymede, Sunday Afternoon,
July 28, 43 A.B.A.". 900 (1957).
2. Ottenberg, Magna Carta Documents: The Story Behind the Great Charter, 43
A.B.A.J. 495, 569 (1957).
3. Magna Carta, 25 Edw. 1, c.29, translated in I B. ScHwmAi-, THE BILL OF
RiGHTrs: A DocuMENTARY HISTORY 12 (1971) [hereinafter cited as ScHwA Tz].
4. Id. at 232.
5. Id. at 235.
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Thus, in Mason's parlance the Magna Carta's pledge not to delay
justice was affirmatively stated as its correlative, the right to a speedy
trial. The history of the implementation of the right to a speedy trial
began when the eighth article of the Mason draft was included, without
change, in the Virginia Declaration of Rights. This study will trace the
evolution of the speedy trial right from the adoption of the Virginia
Declaration of Rights through the promulgation and legislative imple-
mentation of the American Bar Association's Standards Relating to
Speedy Trial.'
The Evolution of the Right to a Speedy Trial
The Virginia Declaration of Rights was adopted on June 12,
1776. 7 Within two months the colony of Pennsylvania placed a speedy
trial provision similar to Virginia's in the Pennsylvania Declaration of
Rights: "IX. that in all prosecutions for criminal offences, a man hath
a right to . . . a speedy public trial. . . ." Within days, a constitu-
tional convention in Delaware adopted the Delaware Declaration of
Rights, with the following provision: "Sec. 14. That in all prosecutions
for criminal offences, every man hath a right. . . to a speedy trial by
an impartial jury.. ....
The next year the right to a speedy trial was written into article
X of the Vermont Declaration of Rights in virtually the same language
used in the Pennsylvania document,8 and within three years the inhabit-
ants of the Commonwealth of Massachusetts placed a substantially
similar provision in the Massachusetts Declaration of Rights.9
By 1780 then, four of the original thirteen colonies, together with
Vermont, had adopted a speedy trial provision creating a fundamental
right against which the government could not prevail.
6. AMERICAN BAR ASSOCIATION PROJECT ON MINIMUM STANDARDS FOR CRIMINAL
JUSTICE, STANDARDS RELATING TO SPEEDY TRIAL (Approved Draft, 1968) [hereinafter
cited as SPEEDY TRIAL STANDARDS]. The text of Speedy Trial Standards is reproduced in
full as Appendix A to this article.
7. 1 SCHWARTZ, supra note 3, at 231.
8. Id. at 323.
9. "Every subject ... ought to obtain right and justice freely, and without being
obliged to purchase it; compleatly, and without any denial, promptly, and without delay;
conformably to the laws." MASS. CONST., pt. 1, Art. XI (1780). Professor Schwartz,
drawing from the Journal of the Convention for Framing a Constitution of Government
for the State of Massachusetts Bay, 1779-1780, shows a somewhat different version of
Art. XII than appears in the official compilation, including the phrase "[E]very subject
shall have a right ... to require a speedy and public trial by an impartial jury of the
country .. . ." 1 SCHwARTZ, supra note 3, at 371-72.
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By 1787, most of the states had adopted a bill of rights and the
movement for the adoption of a federal bill of rights in the anticipated
new federal constitution had strong support. Yet, for a variety of
reasons, the federal Constitution was submitted to the states for ratifica-
tion without a bill of rights.' 0
Indeed a major portion of the debate about the wisdom of the fed-
eral Constitution of 1787 centered upon its failure to adopt a declara-
tion of rights. This debate is exemplified by George Mason's
Objections to the Proposed Federal Constitution and the attacks by
Richard Henry Lee, Elbridge Gerry, and Luther Martin."
It was in Pennsylvania, the second state to ratify the Constitution,
that the "no Bill of Rights" objection first formed a major part of the
debate over a state's actual ratification of the Constitution. 12 During
the course of that debate, John Whitehill, one of the leading opponents
of ratification, proposed recommended amendments to the Constitution
to meet the need for a federal bill of rights. Even though the Penn-
sylvania convention rejected these proposed amendments by a vote of
forty-six to twenty-three they were, perhaps, as important in defeat as
they would have been in victory, because they demonstrated the way
to be taken by states desiring to ratify the Constitution and, at the same
time, secure a federal bill of rights: the inclusion of proposed amend-
ments at the time of ratification.' 3 Significantly, one of Whitehil's pro-
posed amendments would have provided: "Itlhat in all capital and
criminal prosecutions, a man has a right to. . .a speedy trial. .. .
The tactic of the Pennsylvania opponents was used with more
success in Massachusetts where proposals for amendments were trans-
mitted to Congress along with the state's ratification. However, these
proposed amendments did not duplicate any of the basic rights already
protected in the state Declaration of Rights and thus they did not con-
tain a speedy trial provision.' 5
The South Carolina ratifying convention emulated the Massachu-
setts convention by ratifying the Constitution and recommending the
adoption of four amendments.' 6 As in Massachusetts, a speedy trial
10. 1 ScHwArrz, supra note 3, at 435-37.
11. Id. at 443-504.
12. Excerpts from the debate in the Pennsylvania ratifying convention are repro-
duced in 2 ScnwARi-4 supra note 3, at 629-73.
13. Id. at 628.
14. Id. at 659.
15. Id. at 674, 712-14.
16. The proposed amendments are reprinted in 2 ScHwARTz, supra note 3, at 756-
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provision was absent, but the South Carolina action added considerable
impetus to the movement to adopt a federal bill of rights.
The ninth state to ratify the Constitution, thus bringing the new
Constitution into effect in accordance with its terms, was New Hamp-
shire. Again, the Constitution was ratified, and proposed amendments
were adopted and sent along to Congress with the ratification. Again,
a speedy trial provision was absent from the proposed amendments."
It was the Virginia ratifying convention that first adopted a speedy
trial guarantee as one of the recommended constitutional amendments:
"8th. That, in all criminal and capital prosecutions, a man hath a right
to. . .a fair and speedy trial . ,,. 8
One month later the New York ratifying convention, after ratifying
the Constitution, adopted a speedy trial provision in its recommended
amendments. 9
Like Virginia and New York, North Carolina also adopted a
speedy trial provision in its proposed Declaration of Rights: "8. That,
in all capital and criminal prosecutions, a man hath a right to . . .a
fair and speedy trial ... ."'o But unlike the other states, North
Carolina refused to ratify the Constitution unless a declaration of
rights and other amendments were adopted "previous to the ratifica-
tion of the Constitution." 1 North Carolina did not ratify the Constitu-
tion until Congress had passed the Bill of Rights and it was submitted
to the states for ratification.
The three proposals for the inclusion of a speedy trial provision
in the federal Bill of Rights ultimately found expression in the sixth
amendment: "In all criminal prosecutions, the accused shall enjoy the
right to a speedy and public trial ... ."I' Similar speedy trial provi-
sions found their way into many, if not most, of the state constitutions. 23
17. Id. at 760-61.
18. Id. at 841.
19. 'That (except in the Government of the Land and Naval Forces, and of the
Militia when in actual Service, and in cases of Impeachment) . . .such Trial should be
speedy. . . ." U.S. DEP'T OF STATE, DOCUMENTARY HISTORY OF THE CONSTITUTION OF
THE UNITED STATES, H.R. Doc. No. 529. 56th Cong., 2d Sess. 192 (1894).
20. 2 SCHwARTz, supra note 3, at 967.
21. Id. at 932.
22. U.S. CONST. amend. VI. The history of the inclusion of the right to a speedy
trial in the Bill of Rights is traced in 2 ScHwARTZ, supra note 3, at 983-1167. See also
F. HELLER, THE SixTH AMENDMENT 31 (1951).
23. The cases are collected in 21 AM. Jun. 2d Criminal Law § 241 (1965); 22A
C.J.S. Criminal Law § 467(2) (1961).
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Since the sixth amendment speedy trial right was not held to apply
to the states until 1967,24 it was the state constitutional and statutory
provisions which formed the bases of the state defendants' right to a
speedy trial. Even though these speedy trial rights had a common
genesis in the Magna Carta, they evolved with considerable diversity.
Nonetheless, certain common threads were discernible in many juris-
dictions. Generally, the right was conceived as belonging solely to the
defendant. The state's interest was to provide the defendant with a
speedy trial only so long as the defendant wished to be tried with some
dispatch. 25  The articulated interests of the defendant were: (1) pre-
venting undue and oppressive incarceration prior to trial; (2) minimiz-
ing anxiety and concern accompanying public accusation; and (3) limit-
ing the possibility that long delay would impair the ability of an accused
to defend himself.
20
This conception of the interest supporting the speedy trial right
caused the defendant to become the focal point for most speedy trial
litigation. Universally, delays attributable to the defendant were
excluded in the computation of the time within which trial must be
held.27  Most jurisdictions also required that the defendant demand trial
before the running of the speedy trial time period would commence.
2 8
An elaborate waiver doctrine also evolved whereby it was frequently
24. Klopfer v. North Carolina, 386 U.S. 213 (1967). Current constitutional
doctrine has not removed the ambiguity inherent in the sixth amendment speedy trial
right. The leading case sets forth the following test: "We can do little more than identify
some of the factors which courts should assess in determining whether a particular
defendant has been deprived of his right. . . . [W]e identify four such factors: Length
of delay, the reason for the delay, the defendant's assertion of his right, and prejudice to
the defendant. . . . We regard none of the four factors identified . . . as either a
necessary or sufficient condition to the finding of a deprivation of the right of a speedy
trial. Rather, they are related factors and must be considered together with such other
circumstances as may be relevant. In sum, these factors have no talismanic qualities;
courts must still engage in a difficult and sensitive balancing process." Barker v. Wingo,
407 U.S. 514, 530-33 (1972).
25. See, e.g., Smith v. Hooey, 393 U.S. 374, 377-78 (1969); United States v.
Ewell, 383 U.S. 116, 120 (1966); People v. Wilson, 60 Cal. 2d 139, 383 P.2d 452, 32 Cal.
Rptr. 44 (1963); State v. Walker, 48 Del. 190, 100 A.2d 413 (1953); Commonwealth v.
Hanley, 337 Mass. 384, 149 N.E.2d 608, cert. denied, 358 U.S. 850 (1958); People v.
Kraemer, 14 Misc. 2d 42, 177 N.Y.S.2d 425 (1958).
26. See, e.g., Smith v. Hooey, 393 U.S. 374, 377-78 (1969); United States v.
Ewell, 383 U.S. 116, 120 (1966); Commonwealth v. Hanley, 337 Mass. 384, 149 N.E.2d
608, cert. denied, 358 U.S. 850 (1958); People v. Prosser, 309 N.Y. 353, 130 N.E.2d 891
(1955), State v. Hollars, 266 N.C. 45, 145 S.E.2d 309 (1965); State v. Jestes, 75 Wash.
2d 47, 448 P.2d 917 (1968).
27. The cases are collected in Annot., 57 A.L.R.2d 302, 308 (1958).
28. Id. at 326; Annot., 129 A.L.R. 572, 587 (1940).
held that the defendant waived the speedy trial right by entering a valid
plea of guilty,2 9 by expressly consenting to the delay, 0 by failing to
demand a speedy trial,"' or by failing to raise the violation of the speedy
trial right prior to trial.32  In addition, some jurisdictions would find
a violation of the speedy trial right only if the defendant had been
prejudiced by the delay. 33  Coupled with the inherent ambiguity of the
time constraints imposed by the phrase "speedy trial" 34 and the similar
ambiguity inhering in many of the state statutes,35 the speedy trial right
did not loom large in the criminal defendant's panoply of rights.
It was not, however, simple solicitude for the rights of the criminal
defendant, nor a desire to rekindle the fire of the Magna Carta, sym-
bolically recognized in the American Bar Association ceremonies at
Runnymede, that caused the Institute of Judicial Administration at New
York University to propose to the American Bar Association the joint
formulation of minimum standards in the field of criminal justice in
May 1963.38 Rather, the idea of the Standards Project was born
of
29. See, e.g., United States v. Doyle, 348 F.2d 715 (2d Cir.), cert. denied, 382
U.S. 843 (1965); People v. Simmons, 26 Ill. 2d 400, 186 N.E.2d 263 (1962); Moore v.
Crouse, 191 Kan. 323, 380 P.2d 373 (1963); Partsch v. Haskins, 175 Ohio St. 139, 191
N.E.2d 922 (1963); Annot., 57 A.L.R.2d 343 (1958).
30. See, e.g., Matton v. Rhay, 313 F.2d 683 (9th Cir. 1963); In re Lopez, 39 Cal.
2d 118, 245 P.2d 1 (1952); People v. Prosser, 309 N.Y. 353, 130 N.E.2d 891 (1955); 57
A.L.R.2d 295 (1958); Annot., 57 A.L.R.2d 302, 321 (1958); Annot., 129 A.L.R. 582
(1940). The waiver rationale has been frequently used to exclude all delay attributable
to the defendant. See, e.g., People v. Lanigan, 22 Cal. 2d 569, 140 P.2d 24 (1943);
Annot., 148 A.L.R. 176. See cases cited note 26 supra.
31. This rationale has also been frequently used to justify the demand rule. See,
e.g., Bruce v. United States, 351 F.2d 318 (5th Cir. 1965), cert. denied, 384 U.S. 921
(1966); People v. Foster, 261 Mich. 247, 246 N.W. 60 (1933). See also note 27 supra.
32. The cases are collected in Annot., 57 A.L.R.2d 302, 336, 343 (1958).
33. See, e.g., Moss v. State, 50 Ala. App. 643, 282 So. 2d 82 (1973); Preston v.
State, 338 A.2d 562 (Del. 1975); Commonwealth v. Blasser, - Mass. _, 321 N.E.2d
676 (1975); People v. Butcher, 46 Mich. App. 40, 207 N.W.2d 430 (1973); Note, The
Right to a Speedy Trial, 20 STAN. L. Rtv. 476, 481-82 (1968). See also Barker v. Wingo,
407 U.S. 514, 530 (1972).
34. See Barker v. Wingo, 407 U.S. 514 (1972).
35. "Most states have enacted statutes setting forth the time within which a
defendant must be tried following the date he was arrested, held to answer, committed, or,
indicted, and it is these statutes which have received principal attention. If a statutory
violation is found, there is seldom any inquiry into the alleged constitutional denial; and
if the statute has not been violated, it is typically assumed that the constitution is
satisfied. There exists considerable variety and uncertainty in the statutes on such
matters as when the time begins running, what defendants are covered and what the
consequences of excessive delay are." SPEEDY T~iAL STANDAmDS, supra note 6, at 2.
36. Jameson, The Beginning: Background and Development of the ABA Stan-
dards for Criminal Justice, 12 AM. CRiM. L. Rnv. 255 (1974).
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a climate of deep concern over the burgeoning problems of
crime and the correlative crisis in our courts occasioned by over-
whelming caseloads, recidivism, and a seeming incapacity of the
system to respond to the challenges of the Sixties.
3 7
A feasibility study conducted in 1964 concluded that the project was
both necessary and feasible. The ABA Board of Governors and the
House of Delegates approved the undertaking of the Standards Project
in August 1964. Grants were obtained by -the end of the year, a
supervisory committee was established, and advisory committees were
appointed. The charge of these committees was to focus on specific
areas in which standards would be written. The project's overall
purpose was defined as
a major effort of the nation's organized bar . . . attempting to
compile and formulate standards which can. be recommended as a
desirable minimum to be applied to the administration of criminal
justice in all of the 50 states, and when appropriate, throughout
the jurisdiction of the federal government. The underlying objec-
tives are twofold: to promote effective law enforcement and the
adequate protection of the public and to safeguard and amplify the
constitutional rights of those suspected of crime.
38
Each advisory committee assigned one or more topics to a reporter or
drafting committee which then prepared "black letter" standards and
commentary.
The speedy trial topic was assigned to the Advisory Committee
on the Criminal Trial. It was considered a priority matter
not only because of the defendant's concern, which is not always
single-mindedly directed toward prompt dispositions, but also be-
cause of the public's interest in seeing that justice is speedily done.
It was recognized, moreover, that there were fundamentally con-
flicting attitudes toward speedy trial among the states and that
choosing one over the other could have a profound effect on a
state's entire system for administering criminal justice.39
Once the reporter or drafting committee drafted the standards,
they were considered by the advisory committees for approval and pub-
lication in tentative draft form. They were then widely distributed for
37. Clark, The American Bar Association. Standards for Criminal Justice: Pre-
scription for an Ailing System, 47 NoTRE DAMm LAw. 429 (1972).
38. Office of the Criminal Justice Project, Institute of Judicial Administration,
American Bar Association Project on Minimum Standards for Criminal Justice, Apr.
22, 1966. The term "minimum standards" was first used. Later, at the suggestion of
Warren E. Burger, then chairperson of the ABA's Special Committee on Minimum
Standards for the Administration of Criminal Justice, the word "minimum" was dropped.
Jameson, The Beginning: Background and Development of the ABA Standards for
Criminal Justice, 12 AM. CRIM. L. Rav. 255, 258 (1974).
39. SPEEDY TRIAL STANDARDS, supra note 6, Preface, at vii.
comments and suggestions. Once revised, they were submitted to the
ABA Board of Governors and to the House of Delegates for final
approval. The Standards Relating to Speedy Trial were approved in
February 1968, not quite eleven years after the ABA ceremonies at
Runnymede.
The Speedy Trial Standards
The broad objective of the Speedy Trial Standards was to
eliminate the uncertainty surrounding the speedy trial right and to deter-
mine "how the interest of the defendant and the public in prompt trials
should be defined, protected, and achieved." '  To accomplish these
objectives, the Standards began with a redefinition of the interests in
prompt criminal trials. No longer was the right conceived as being
solely that of the criminal defendant:
The interest of the public in the prompt disposition of criminal
cases, however, must also be recognized. Speedy trial may be of
concern to the defendant, as he may want to preserve the means
of proving his defense, to avoid a long period of pretrial imprison-
ment or conditional release, and to avoid a long period of anxiety
and public suspicion arising out of the accusation. From the point
of view of the public, a speedy trial is necessary to preserve the
means of proving the charge, to maximize the deterrent effect of
prosecution and conviction, and to avoid, in some cases, an
extended period of pretrial freedom by the defendant during which
time he may flee, commit other crimes, or intimidate witnesses.
41
The text of the Standards is divided into four parts: Part I, the
Trial Calendar; Part H, Determining What Is a Speedy Trial; Part III,
Special Procedures: Person Serving Term of Imprisonment; and Part
IV, Consequences of Denial of Speedy Trial.
Part I, consisting of three sections, governs the management of the
criminal trial calendar. Section 1.1 adopts the policies of the federal
system and those states which require that the trial of criminal cases
take precedence over civil trials, 2 and provides that among criminal
trials preference be given to the trial of defendants in custody and
40. Erickson, An Overview of the ABA Standards, 12 AM. GRIM. L. REv. 277, 299
(1974).
41. SPEEDY TRIAL ST'DAmAS, supra note 6, Commentary on § 1.1, at 10-11.
Since the promulgation of the Speedy Trial Standards, the United States Supreme Court
has recognized that the public's interest in speedy criminal trials must be calculated as
part of the constitutional equation for determining a violation of the sixth amendment
speedy trial right. See Barker v. Wingo, 407 U.S. 514, 519 (1972); United States v.
Marion, 404 U.S. 307, 330 (1971).
42. Erickson, An Overview of the ABA Standards, 12 AM. CiuM. L. REv. 277, 300
(1974).
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defendants whose pretrial liberty is reasonably believed to present
unusual risks. 43  Taking the view that there is an "inherent residual
power of the court over its own calendars,""4 section 1.2 vests control
over the trial calendar in the court and requires the prosecutor to advise
the court of facts relevant in determining the order of cases on the
calendar. This section also requires the prosecutor to file periodically
a public report explaining the reasons for delay in any case for which
the defendant has not requested a trial within a prescribed period fol-
lowing charging.45  Section 1.3 attempts to regulate the pervasive prob-
lem of continuances in the following language:
The court should grant a continuance only upon a showing of
good cause and only for so long as is necessary, taking into account
not only the request or consent of the prosecution or defense, but
also the public interest in prompt disposition of the case.
In three sections, Part II seeks to define the speedy trial right. A
specific time limit is the backbone of any speedy trial right,4 and sec-
tion 2.1 requires the adoption of a time limitation expressed in terms
of days or months running from the events specified in section 2.2 The
periods of "necessary delay" specified in section 2.3 are to be excluded
in computing the time for trial.
In addition, section 2.2 states that the speedy trial time period runs
"without demand by the defendant." Thus Part II, without specifying
a particular time period, requires the adoption of such a time period,
and identifies both the point at which the time for trial begins running
and the periods during which the running of the time is tolled.
Part III seeks to set the boundaries of the speedy trial right of a
person serving a term of imprisonment for another offense. Section
3.1 provides that if the prosecutor knows that a defendant is serving
a prison term either within or outside the state, the prosecutor must
promptly undertake to obtain the prisoner's presence for trial or file
a detainer."7 If a detainer is filed, the prison officials must notify the
43. SPEEDY TRIA STANDARDs, supra note 6, § 1.1(b).
44. Id., Commentary on § 1.2, at 12.
45. The standard does not suggest an appropriate time period.
46. Although the United States Supreme Court has refused to adopt any fixed time
limit in defining the sixth amendment right to a speedy trial, presumably a relatively
short time period would pass constitutional muster. Though delay in itself has no
"talismanic quality," and is thus not sufficient to establish a violation of the right, it is,
nevertheless, a necessary condition; there can be no violation of the speedy trial right
without delay. Barker v. Wingo, 407 U.S. 514 (1972).
47. A detainer is a request by the prosecutor on behalf of the state that he be
notified when a prisoner's sentence is ready to expire. The purpose of this is to give the
prosecutor time to extradite the prisoner for prosecution. See generally D. WnxLER, Tun
LAw oF DETAmNEns (1973).
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prisoner and inform him of his right to demand trial. If trial is
demanded, the prison officials must notify the prosecutor, who must
then promptly seek to obtain the presence of the prisoner for trial.
Subject to the prisoner's right to contest the legality of an interjuris-
dictional transfer, the prison officials are obligated to deliver the
prisoner into the temporary custody of the prosecutor. Under section
3.2, the speedy trial time period s commences to run when the pris-
oner's presence has been obtained, subject to the excluded periods
listed in section 2.3. However, time periods caused by the prosecutor's
"unreasonable delay" in either filing a detainer or securing the
presence of the prisoner for trial are not excluded from the speedy trial
time period.
Part IV sets forth consequences of the denial of the speedy trial
right. If the defendant or his counsel moves for discharge prior to trial
or entry of a plea of guilty, section 4.1 requires absolute discharge: a
discharge which will forever bar prosecution for the offense charged
and for any other offense required to be joined with that offense.49 In
jurisdictions choosing to adopt a shorter speedy trial time period for
defendants held in custody, section 4.2 requires the release of the incar-
cerated defendant on his own recognizance upon the running of the
shorter period.50
The Speedy Trial Standards, if implemented, would thus make
substantial changes in the law of many states: specific time limits
expressed in days or months would be adopted and excluded periods
would be specified; the demand rule would be abolished; and the
defendant would not have to show prejudice to establish a violation of
the speedy trial right. Though delays attributable to the defendant are
among those excluded in computing the speedy trial time period, sec-
tion 2.3 was drafted to limit the situations in which delay would be
excluded from the computation. 5 Lastly, the waiver doctrine is
48. The time period is adopted pursuant to section 2.1.
49. The United States Supreme Court has held that absolute discharge is also the
remedy for a violation of the sixth amendment speedy trial right. Strunk v. United
States, 412 U.S. 434, 438-40 (1973).
50. This section does not affect the defendant's right to absolute discharge upon
the running of the longer period. See text accompanying note 103 infra.
51. "Although a few states have attempted to enumerate by statute all the excuses
for delay . . . a majority of jurisdictions merely provide for additional time upon a
showing of 'good cause'. . . . A number of other states have identified some legitimate
causes of delay; the most common are delay 'upon application of the defendant' . . . and
delay because of the absence of material evidence. . . . In states with only a general
'good cause' provision or with a far from complete listing of proper bases for delay, the
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limited to failure of the defendant or his counsel to move for discharge
prior to trial or entry of a plea of guilty.52 Thus, implementation of
the Speedy Trial Standards could make significant changes in the
speedy trial law of many states. The remainder of this article examines
what the impact of the Standards has actually been.
Implementation of the Standards
Introduction and Methodology
In order to ascertain the impact of the Standards on the statutory
law dealing with speedy trials, we conducted a study of the relevant
statutory provisions of the fifty states, the District of Columbia, and the
federal court system.53 Although we examined the numerous statutes
appellate courts-and presumably the trial courts--have found the task of determining
what events justify extension of the statutory limits a most difficult one. ... The
premise of the above standard is that insofar as it is possible the basic policy considera-
tions involved in such determinations should be set forth by statutes or rule of court."
SPEEDY TRIAL STANDARDS, supra note 6, Commentary on § 2.1, at 15-16. See also id.,
Commentary on § 2.3, 26-32. However, section 2.3 (h) does provide for the exclusion of
"[o]ther periods of delay for 'good cause'." Although this subsection has the potential
of dissipating the goal of section 2.3, the commentary on the section makes it clear that
this subsection is to be applied in unique situations not covered by the other subsections.
52. SPEEDY TiL STANDARDS, supra note 6, § 4.1.
53. The complete list of statutes and rules covering the field is as follows: Speedy
Trial Act of 1974, 18 U.S.C. §§ 3161-74 (Supp. V, 1975); 13 ALA. CODE tit. 13, § 118,
tit. 15, §§ 197, 251 (1958); ALAsKA (CrM.) R. CT., 45 (1974); Auz. R. CIM.
P. 8 (1973 & Supp. 1975); Axm STAT. ANN. §§ 43-1701 to -1711 (1964); CAr..
PEN. CODE §§ 1047, 1050, 1382 (West 1970 & Supp. 1976); CoLo. REv. STAT. ANN.
(1973) § 18-1-405; COLO. R. CiuM. P. 48(b) (1973); CONN. GEN. STAT. REv. §§ 54-
139, 186, 193 (1958); DEL. CODE ANN. tit. 10, § 6910 (1974 Rev.); DEL. SuPER. CT.
(CRIM.) R. 48, 50 (1974); D.C. Cr. R. (Cmm. Div.) 48, 101, 111 (Supp. 1975); FLA.
R. CruM. P. 3-191 (West 1973); GA. CODE ANN. §§ 27-1901 to -2002 (1972); HAwAH
REV. STAT. § 635-3 (Supp. 1975); IDAHO CODE ANN. §§ 19-3501 to -3506 (1947); ILL.
ANN. STAT. ch. 38, §§ 103-5, 11404 (Smith-Hurd 1963); IND. R. CRIM. P. 4 (Supp.
1976); IowA CODE ANN. §§ 795.1-.3 (Supp. 1976); KAN. STAT. ANN. §§ 22-3401 to
-3402 (1974); Ky. R. Cium. P. 9.02, 9.04 (1970); LA. CODE CRM. PRO. ANN. art. 578-
582 (West 1966); ME. REv. STAT. ANN. tit. 15, § 1202 (1964), DsT. Cr. (CRM.) R.
48(b) (Supp. 1976); MD. ANN. CODE art. 27, § 591 (Supp. 1976); MAss. GEN. LAWS
ANN. ch. 277 §§ 72-73 (1972); MICH. COM. LAws ANN. §§ 768.1, 780.133 (1968);
MInN. STAT. ANN. §§ 611.05 (1964); MNN. R. CRmM. PRo. 30.02 (Supp. 1976); MIss.
CODE ANN. § 99-17-1 (1972); Mo. ANN. STAT. §§ 545.710, .730, .780, .890-.920 (1949);
MONT. REv. CODES ANN. §§ 95-1703, -1706, -1708 (1947 & Supp. 1975); NEB. REV.
STAT. §§ 29-1205 to -1209 (1975); NEv. REv. STAT. §§ 174.515, 178.556, .562, .592
(1967); N.H. REv. STAT. ANN. §§ 491: APP. R. 43, 48 596-A:I, 603:1 (1974); N.J
STAT. ANN. §§ 3:25-1 to -3 (1976); N.M. STAT. ANN. § 41-23-37 (Supp. 1975); N.Y.
CRm. PRo. LAw §§ 30.20, .30, 210.20 (McKinney 1971 & Sapp. 1975); N.C. GEN. STAT.
§§ 15A-701 to -706 (1975); N.D. CENT. CODE §§ 29-19-01 to -11; N.D. R. CRIM. P. 48,
50 (1974); Omo REv. CODE ANN. §§ 2945.71-.73 (Page Supp. 1975); OKLA. STAT. ANN.
in light of the full set of the Speedy Trial Standards, particular concern
was paid to comparing the statutes with four standards felt to be the
key to the ABA proposal. These key standards are section 1.3 (con-
tinuances), section 2.1 (speedy trial time limits and the listing of
excluded periods), section 2.3(b) (trial docket congestion as justifiable
delay), and section 4.1 (absolute discharge).
Conducting our statutory search with this emphasis, we were able
first to discern an overview of the statutory implementation. Then we
were able to bring that picture into fine tune by categorizing the level
of implementation in terms of the four key standards. The ensuing
discussion of our findings will proceed in the same manner, beginning
with a broad statutory overview, followed by a more detailed study of
the reception given the key standards by state and federal legislators.
Since no implementation of the Standards could have occurred
prior to their promulgation in early 1968, we have confined our detailed
key standards study to those jurisdictions which have adopted or
amended their relevant statutes since 1968. To insure a broad over-
view, however, we have included in the first part of our study jurisdic-
tions having pre-1968 statutes. We note such statutes in terms of their
consistency with, rather than implementation of, the Standards.1
4
To flesh out our detailed key standards study, a review of the rele-
vant case law will be necessary. But since a discussion of all speedy
trial case law from fifty-two American jurisdictions would be far beyond
the scope of this article, we have confined our study to the most recent
cases in each jurisdiction which cite the Speedy Trial Standards.55
tit. 22 §§ 811-17 (1969); ORE. REv. STAT. §§ 135.745-0.775 (1975); PA. STAT. tit. 19 §
781 (1964); PA. R. CriM. P. 316, 1100 (Supp. 1976); R.I. GEN. LAWS ANN. §§ 12-13-6
to -7 (1969); S.C. CODE ANN. § 17-509 (1962); S.D. COMp. LAWS ANN. §§ 23-34 to -05
(1967); TENN. CODE ANN. § 40-2102 (1975); Tx. CODE CRIM. PRO. art. 29.01, .03,
32.01 (1966 & Supp. 1975); UTAH CODE ANN. §§ 77-51 to -6 (1953); VT. R. CRIM. P.
48, 50 (1973); VA. CODE ANN. §§ 19.2-241 to -243 (1975); WASH. SUPER. Cr. CRIM. R.
3.3 (1974); W. VA. CODE ANN. § 62-3-1 (Supp. 1975); Wis. STAT. ANN. § 971.10
(1971), as amended, (Supp. 1975); Wyo. STAT. ANN. §§ 7-234 to -236 (1957); Wyo. R.
CRiM. P. 45(b), 47 (1971).
54. This article treats the operative date of a statute as that of its enactment,
which may not necessarily be the same as the date of the general enactment of the state's
code. A statute which has retained its substantive form from its original enactment
decades ago throughout numerous reenactments of the state code has been treated as
pre-1968 even if the latest code edition was enacted in 1976. Where a given statute has
been amended in steps, partly before and partly after 1968, it will be treated as either
pre- or post-1968 depending on when the larger part of the amendments were made. The
post-1968 amendments just referred to, if they relate to the four key standards, are
discussed in the appropriate sections of the more detailed study following the overview.
55. This study is current to April 21, 1976.
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We were able to pare down the relatively large list of cases quite
readily. The large majority of these cases merely mentions the general
propositions contained in the Standards, but the Standards are not on
point with the particular cases.5" Cases which merely note that the
state's statute is already in conformity with a particular standard,57 and
those which note with approval certain of the Standards which were
subsequently incorporated into the state's statutory scheme, 8 are not
discussed, because a discussion of the adopted statute was considered
adequate. Covered in detail, then, are those few remaining cases
representing states which have not spoken previously on the issue, or
which note with approval, expressly adopt, or reject the four key
standards.59
General Statutory Overview
Because the Speedy Trial Standards were promulgated in 1968,
that year provides the first conceptual dividing line in our discussion of
statutory implementation. Fifty-four percent of the American jurisdic-
tions have speedy trial statutes which originated either completely or
primarily before 1968.0 With respect to some of these states, "speedy
trial statute" is clearly a misnomer: the gaps in these states' statutory
schemes are much more significant than the areas covered by the lan-
guage of the statutes. 61 In fact, fully 48 percent of the states, or 89
percent of the states with pre-1968 statutes, reveal little or no con-
sistency between their statutes and the Standards."2 In these states,
56. See, e.g., People ex rel Coca v. District Court of Seventh Judicial District, 530
P.2d 958 (Colo. 1975).
57. See, e.g., Peterkin v. State, 543 P.2d 418, 422 (Alaska 1975).
58. See, e.g., Jaramillo v. District Court, 174 Colo. 561, 484 P.2d 1219 (1971).
59. A small number of cases adopt ABA standards not characterized as key for the
purposes of this study. See, e.g., State v. Sanders, 163 Mont. 209, 516 P.2d 372 (1973).
60. Where percentages are mentioned in this section, 100% means all fifty states.
District of Columbia and federal statutes are not included in the calculation.
61. See, e.g., ALA. CODE tit. 13, § 118, tit. 15, §§ 197, 251 (1958 & Supp. 1973);
Ky. R. ClM. P. 9.02, 9.04 (1970). What is important about these statutes is not what
they actually cover, but the fact that they reflect the full extent of the law on speedy trial
in Alabama and Kentucky.
62. This article is concerned with the implementation of the Speedy Trial Stand-
ards by statutes, and only to a lesser extent by case law. Some states which have
statutory schemes having little consistency with the Speedy Trial Standards have never-
theless achieved a measure of consistency through case law which has developed
independently of the Speedy Trial Standards. California serves as an example. See
JUDIcrAL CoUNCIL OF CALIFORNIA, COMPARATIVE ANALYSIS OF AMERICAN BAR Asso-
CIATION MINIMUM STANDARDS FOR CRIMINAL JusncE WITa CALiFoRNIA LAW 150-67
(1974). Although the case law development in such a state may produce some measure
the pre-Speedy Trial Standards law continues to govern the speedy trial
right.
63
Only three states with pre-1968 speedy trial statutes-Illinois,
Louisiana, and Nevada--demonstrate significant statutory consistency
with the Speedy Trial Standards. Of these, Illinois comes closest to the
Standards, and, in terms of specificity, actually exceeds them.64 The
citation in the Standards to Illinois law65 reveals that the Illinois statute
and the Standards spring from a common source.
Turning to those remaining statutes which are post-1968 in origin
(46 percent of the total), three sub-categories may be discerned.
First, there are ten jurisdictions (18 percent) which reflect little or no
consistency with the Standards: The District of Columbia, Georgia,
Hawaii, Maryland, Montana, North Dakota, Oregon, New Jersey, Ver-
mont, and Wisconsin.66
A slightly smaller number of jurisdictions (16 percent) can be
described as largely consistent with the Standards: Alaska, Arizona,
Colorado, Florida, Nebraska, New York, Ohio, Washington, and the
federal courts. 67 In light of both the post-1968 nature of these statutes
and their strong substantive similarity with the Standards, it is evident
that some degree of implementation of the ABA model has occurred
in these jurisdictions.
Finally, six states (12 percent), fall between the above two sub-
categories. The precise effect that the Standards have had on the
states in this group is difficult to assess. Five of these six states-Indiana,
Kansas, New Mexico, North Carolina and Pennsylvania-show areas of
both substantive similarity and dissimilarity with the Standards.68 The
sixth state, Virginia, presents an implementation picture equally diffi-
cult to assess but for a different reason. Because Virginia's prior rele-
vant statutes were repealed and replaced in 1975, and the new laws
present few substantive changes from the pre-1968 scheme, it is
unclear to what extent the legislators were influenced by the Standards.
of consistency with the Speedy Trial Standards, the discussion of that independently
developed case law is beyond the scope of this article.
63. See text accompanying notes 24-35 supra. Of course, the general description
of this pre-Speedy Trial Standards law is not accurate for every jurisdiction. California,
for example, serves as an exception. See note 62 supra.
64. ILL. ANN. STAT. ch. 38, § 114-4 (Smith-Hurd 1970) provides for continuances
upon express criteria.
65. SPEEDY TRxu STANDAs, supra note 6, Commentary on § 2.1, at 14.
66. For citations to the statutes see note 53 supra.
67. See id.
68. See id.
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What tentative observations can be made about these twenty-five
post-1968 jurisdictions? The picture is very cloudy. By any important
criteria which can be used to compare the 18 percent having little or
no consistency with the 16 percent which are largely consistent, no
patterns readily emerge. No geographical clustering sets the two sub-
categories apart; both categories contain jurisdictions in the South,
Northeast, Midwest, and West. Classifications such as rural or urban,
populous or non-populous offer little help, as both parts of such classi-
fications can be found in either sub-category. Any attempt to find a
pattern based on the political affiliations of the legislators who enacted
these statutes in their present form is stymied by the fact that 42 per-
cent of the jurisdictions in these two sub-categories promulgated their
speedy trial rules not by legislative enactment, but by rules of court
originating in their highest courts.
So, unlike Hercule Poirot, who climaxes every investigation by
revealing to the assembled suspects all the ways in which the murder
might have occurred (but didn't) and then shocks them with the solu-
tion, we cannot explain why these post-1968 statutes fall as they do.
Instead, the remainder of this article turns to a more detailed examina-
tion of how the post-1968 statutes were influenced by the four key
standards listed earlier.
Implementation of the Key Standards
(1) Section 1.3-Continuances
Since the excessive granting of continuances can effectively un-
dermine the provisions of a speedy trial statute, the standard which
is adopted to regulate this practice is crucial. The test in section 1.3
is expressed in terms of "good cause." Although there is a great deal
of variety among the post-1968 statutes with respect to continuances,
three categories and a residuum can be discovered. First, granting a
continuance only upon a showing of good cause is the statutory pattern
in Kansas, Nebraska, New Mexico, Virginia, and Washington. 9
Second, Georgia and Oregon employ the slightly lesser standard of suf-
ficient cause.7 0 It should be noted that both the grounds of good cause
and sufficient cause are commonplace among pre-1968 statutes as
69. KAN. STAT. ANN. § 22-3401 (1974); NED. REV. STAT. § 29-1206 (1975); N.M.
STAT. ANN. § 41-23-37(c) (Supp. 1975); VA. CODE ANN. § 19.2-241 (1975); WAH.
REV. CODE ANN. § 10.46.080, WASH. SUPER. Or. CUM. R. 3.3 (e) (Supp. 1974).
70. GA. CODB ANN. § 27-2002 (1972); ORE. REV. STAT. § 135.750 (1975).
well. 7 ' Third, statutes requiring a stricter standard for granting con-
tinuances than the ABA model can be found in Arizona, Florida, and
Maryland. These statutes require that extraordinary or exceptional cir-
cumstances must be shown.72
By far the largest number of states falls into a residual category,
and reveals grounds for granting continuances at variance with those
mentioned above: in the "ends" or "interests of justice" (Alaska, New
York, and the federal system), 3 "reasonable continuances" (Ohio),
74
and continuances merely "for cause" (the District of Columbia and Wis-
consin) .75 The statutes of Indiana, North Carolina, Pennsylvania, and
Vermont contain unique provisions which are irreducible to any short
standard-setting phrase.76  It should be noted that one Indiana appel-
late court has adopted a continuance rule substantially similar to section
1.3, citing that standard in its opinions.77 Finally, statutes in Colorado,
Hawaii, and New Jersey reveal no continuance standard at all.
78
It is readily apparent that, except for the extraordinary circum-
stances standard, all the continuance standards mentioned, including
that of the ABA, leave a great deal of discretion in the trial judge. Dis-
tinctions between "good cause," "sufficient cause," and "cause" reduce
themselves to minor matters of degree in a judge's exercise of discre-
tion. Such vague standards and grants of discretion may be necessary
71. See, e.g., TENN. CODE ANN. § 40-2503 (1975) (good cause); TEX. CODE CalM.
PRO. art. 29.03 (1966) (sufficient cause).
72. ARIZ. R. CRIM. P. 8.5(b) (1973); FLA. R. CRiM. P. 3.191(f) (1973);
MD. ANN. CODE art. 27, § 591(a) (1976).
73. ALASKA (CRIM.) R. CT. 45(d)(2) (1973); N.Y. CRrm. PRO. LAw §
30.30(4)(b) (McKinney Supp. 1975); 18 U.S.C. § 3161(h)(8) (Supp. V, 1975).
Though this standard is perhaps more vague than that of section 1.3, these jurisdictions
qualify their "interest of justice" language by noting that the interest of the defendant,
and of the public in the prompt disposition of criminal cases, should be taken into
account. By so doing, they align themselves quite closely with the overall wording and
spirit of section 1.3. Other states parallel section 1.3's concern for the public interest.
See KAN. STAT. ANN. § 22-3401 (1974); MONT. REV. CODES ANN. § 95-1708(d)
(1969); NED. REV. STAT. § 29-1206 (1975); UTAH CODE ANN. § 77-29-1 (1953); WASH.
SUPER. Or. CRIM. R. 3.3(e) (Supp. 1974).
74. OHio REv. CODE ANN. § 2945.72H (1975).
75. D.C. Or. R. (CRiM. DIv.) 111 (Supp. 1975); Wis. STAT. ANN. § 971.10(3)(a)
(1971).
76. IND. R. CRim. P. (Supp. 1976); N.C. GEN. STAT. § 15A-704 (1975); PA. R.
CRiM. P. 1100(c) (Supp. 1976); VT. R. CaiM. P. 50(c) (1974).
77. Smith v. State, 330 N.E.2d 384, 386 (Ind. App. 1975); Stock v. State, 319
N.E.2d 871, 873 (Ind. App. 1974); Dockery v. State, 317 N.E.2d 453, 458 (Ind. App.
1974).
78. COLO. REv. STAT. ANN. § 18-1-405 (1973); HAWAn REV. STAT. § 635-3 (Supp.
1975); N.J. (CiM.) R. CT. 3:25-1 to -3 (1976).
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to a certain extent to preserve flexibility, but they threaten to under-
mine the very objectives of another key part of the ABA model, section
2.1's fixed speedy trial time limits.
Certain statutory schemes may alleviate this undermining process.
For example, circumstances may be expressly listed which constitute,
and thus implicitly limit, good or sufficient cause.7 9 As another device,
the official commentary to the North Carolina statutes80 notes that con-
tinuances sought by the defendant are deliberately left within the
running time within which trial must be held, in order to deter the
judge from granting frivolous continuances. At the least, the reasons for
granting a continuance should be a required addition to the trial record,
as in Alaska.81 Whatever continuance standard is used, however, and
whatever amount of discretion is granted, there will always be some
conflict between such a standard and that part of the statute setting
fixed trial time limits (as represented by section 2.1 of the Speedy Trial
Standards). We now turn to an examination of section 2.1 and the
level of its implementation in the post-1968 statutes.
(2) Section 2.1--Speedy Trial Time Limits; Listing of Excluded Periods
All the jurisdictions listed in the general overview as being largely
consistent with the Speedy Trial Standards8" follow section 2.1's pattern
of setting a time limit for trial in days or months and listing those
grounds which may be excluded from the running of the time period.
These jurisdictions-the federal courts, Alaska, Arizona, Colorado,
Florida, Nebraska, New York, Ohio, and Washington-are joined by
Indiana, Kansas, North Carolina, Pennsylvania, and Virginia, to make
section 2.1 the most widely implemented of all the key standards.
88
The next largest group of states gives a trial time period in days
or months as above but provides no listing of excluded periods: Mary-
79. Washington uses such a scheme to a small degree. WASH. Su'P.R. CT. Calm.
R. 3.3(e) (Supp. 1974).
80. N.C. GEN. STAT. § 15A-706, Comment (1975).
81. ALASKA (CaRM.) R. Cr. 45(e) (1973).
82. See text accompanying note 67 supra.
83. 18 U.S.C. § 3161(b), (c), (h) (Supp. V, 1975); ALASKA CPlM. R. Cr. 45(b),
(d) (1974); AIz. R. CluM. P. 8.2, 8.4 (Supp. 1975); CoLo. REV. STAT. ANN. § 18-1-
405(1) (1973); FLA. R. CGuM. P. 3.191(a), (d), (f) (1973); IND. R. CalM. P. 4(a)-(c),
(f) (Supp. 1976); KAN. STAT. ANN. § 22-3402(1)-(3) (1974); NEB. REv. STAT. § 29-
1207(),(a) (1975); N.Y. Cium. PRo. LAw § 30.30(1), (2), (4) (McKinney Supp.
1975); N.C. GEN. STAT. § 15A-702 to -706 (1975); Onio RaV. CODE ANN. § 2945.71
(1975); PA. R. CRIM. P. 1100(a), (d) (1975); VA. CODE ANN. § 19.2-241, -243 (1975);
WAsH. SuPER. Or. Cpnm. R. 3.3 (b)-(d) (Supp. 1974).
land, Montana, New Mexico, Oregon, Vermont, and Wisconsin. 4
Among the post-1968 statutes, only Georgia's 5 adheres to the scheme,
still commonplace among pre-1968 statutes,86 requiring trial within a
certain number of court terms rather than days or months.
Those jurisdictions remaining-the District of Columbia, Hawaii,
New Jersey, and North Dakota-provide no time period within which
trial must be had. 7  Thus, how soon a defendant is accorded trial in
these jurisdictions is a matter left entirely to the discretion of the trial
court.
The concept of excluding certain listed circumstances from the
running of a trial time period is a useful way to inject flexibility into
the administration of criminal justice while still promoting the speedy
trial right. A thorough examination of the myriad particular excluded
circumstances, and their implementation nationwide, is beyond the
scope of this article. However, one common ground for exclusion-
congestion of the trial docket-has such a potential to undermine the
speedy trial right, and is so prevalent throughout American jurisdictions,
that it deserves more detailed treatment.
(3) Section 2.3(b)-Docket Congestion As Justiliable Delay
Section 2.3(b) does not exclude from the trial time period all
delay resulting from crowded court dockets but rather excludes only
the delay "attributable to exceptional circumstances. 8 8  This position
serves as a rough midpoint on a line that runs from docket congestion
always justifying delay at one extreme, to congestion never justifying
delay at the other extreme. While most post-1968 statutes are silent
on this issue, those statutes taking a position may be characterized as
points along our imaginary line.
We begin our study at that extreme at which any docket congestion,
no matter how unexceptional, justifies delay. In this extreme position,
84. MD. ANN. CODE art. 27, § 591(a) (1976); MONT. REv. CoDES ANN. 95-1703
(Supp. 1975) (time counted for misdemeanors only); N.M. STAT. ANN. § 41-23-37(b)
(Supp. 1975); ORE. REv. STAT. § 135.745, .747 (1975) (time counted for information or
indictment only; trial must be held "within reasonable period"); VT. R. CRIM. P. 48(b)
(1974); Ws. STAT. ANN. § 971.10(1)-(2) (1971 & Supp. 1975).
85. Georgia also has no provision specifying excluded time periods. See GA. CODE
ANN. § 27-1901 (1972).
86. See, e.g., ARK. STAT. ANN. §§ 43-1708 to -1709 (1964).
87. See HAwAI REV. STAT. § 635-3 (Supp. 1975); N.J. (CiuM.) R. Cr. 3:25-2
(1976). The District of Columbia and North Dakota have no speedy trial statutes.
88. SPEEDY TRALm STANDARDS, supra note 6, § 2.3(b).
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where the defendant's speedy trial right is most put in jeopardy, we
find three states: Indiana, Kansas, and Texas. 9 All three discuss this
issue under their statutory sections dealing with grounds for continu-
ance; Indiana speaks in terms of trial calendar congestion, while the
latter two states refer to insufficient time to try the case.
Between the position taken by the Speedy Trial Standards and that
of the above three states lie New York and Pennsylvania. New York
allows dismissal of the indictment "where the people are not ready for
trial within [trial time periods]."9 0  Pennsylvania grants the prosecu-
tion's request for a continuance "only if trial cannot be commenced
within the prescribed period despite due diligence by the Common-
wealth." 91  Thus New York and Pennsylvania adopt a mid-position
which has some reason to it:92 while prosecutorial delay is not con-
doned, delay caused by a court is allowed. Such a model may reflect
a balancing of the system between prosecution and defense. Yet the
problem with all such statutes on this side of the ABA exceptional cir-
cumstances midpoint is that their implicit recognition of court-caused
delay, while reasonable in the shortrun, may actually impair the incen-
tive for only longrun legislative effort to end docket delay, either by
restructuring access to the court system itself or by continuing the run-
ning of trial time periods despite court-caused delays.
The commentary to section 2.3(b) recognizes the practical diffi-
culty a docket delay provision poses for future corrective legislation,93
and rejects any such position without the exceptional-circumstances
teeth to prevent its abuse. This ABA position has been followed in
Arizona, by statute,94 and in Washington, by appellate case authority.95
89. IND. R. Camm. P. 4(A)-(B) (Supp. 1976); KAN. STAT. ANN. § 22-3402(3) (d)
(1974) (delay for this ground limited to 30 days); TEX CODE CRIM. PRO. art. 29.01 (3)
(Supp. 1975) amending Tnx. CODE CRnM. PRo. art. 29.01 (1966).
90. N.Y. CRnM. PRo. LAw § 30.30 (McKinney Supp. 1975).
91. PA. R. CRIM. P. 1100(c) (1975).
92. See N.Y. ClUm. PRo. LAw § 30.30, Practice Commentary (McKinney Supp.
1975), for a discussion of New York's "ready" rule, as opposed to a "virtually no excuse"
rule.
93. "If congestion excuses long delays, there is lacking sufficient inducement for
the state to remedy congestion." SPEEDY TRArL STANDARDS, supra note 6, at 27.
94. APuz. R. CInm. P. 8.4(c) (1975).
95. State v. Durham, 13 Wash. App. 675, 681-82, 537 P.2d 816, 820 (1975) cites
the commentary by the task force that prepared the Washington Rules, expressly
adopting the rationale behind section 2.3(b).
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Case authority in Nebraska9" and Iowa97 is more equivocal on this issue,
and does not appear to harmonize fully with the ABA position.
On the other side of our ABA midpoint, a position less charitable
to docket congestion than that of the Speedy Trial Standards is taken
by the federal Speedy Trial Act of 1974. The act initially prohibits
general congestion of the court calendar to be used as grounds for a
continuance.98 A later section entitled "Judicial Emergency" then pro-
vides for time extensions caused by crowded court calendars, but only
as approved by the Judicial Conference of the United States after a
rigorous review procedure.9 9 Further extensions within six months
after those initially approved have expired must receive the consent of
Congress. 10 ° The act thus reflects an attempt to balance the constitu-
tional exigency of defendants' speedy trial right against the realities of
the criminal justice system.
At the extreme end of the line where no docket congestion, no
matter how exceptional, justifies delays in the trial time period, the
Florida statute 01 stands alone. Allowing a continuance only upon a
showing of "exceptional circumstances," the statute adds that such cir-
cumstances "shall not include general congestion of the court docket,
lack of diligent preparation or failure to obtain available witnesses, or
other avoidable or foreseeable delays."'
1 02
So far, we have focused upon the time limits imposed to insure
speedy trials, and the statutory means employed to avoid the running
of the clock under certain circumstances. For time limits to have any
effectiveness, however, there must be sanctions imposed when those
limits are breached. The Speedy Trial Standards and our discussion
of their implementation conclude with the consequences of a denial of
speedy trial.
(4) Section 4.1-Absolute Discharge
Under section 4.1's absolute discharge provision, a defendant's
96. State v. Alvarez, 189 Neb. 281, 289-91, 202 N.W.2d 604, 609 (1972). The
court cites section 2.3 but adds, "This court, however, is not prepared to say that court
congestion may not sometimes constitute 'good cause'." Id. at 202. The "sometimes" is
not elaborated.
97. State v. Hines, 225 N.W.2d 156 (Iowa 1975). The Hines court, in dicta cites
with approval section 2.3(b) and State v. Alvarez, 189 Neb. 281, 202 N.W.2d 604
(1972), for the proposition that "[n]on-chronic 'court congestion', arising out of unique,
non-recurring events and resulting in only a short delay may constitute 'good cause'
.... " 225 N.W.2d at 158.
98. 18 U.S.C. § 3161(h) (8) (C) (Supp. V, 1975).
99. Id. § 3174(b).
100. Id. § 3174(c).
101. FLA. R. CiuM. P. 3.191(f) (1972).
102. Id.
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discharge for failure of the prosecution to meet speedy trial time limits
acts as a bar to any reprosecution of the offense charged.10 3  A bare
plurality of those states having post-1968 statutes are in conformity with
this position: Alaska, Colorado, Florida, Georgia, Nebraska, New
York, Ohio, Pennsylvania, Virginia, and Washington.10 4  Section 4.1
has been adopted in Iowa and Rhode Island by recent case authority.0 5
Kansas' 0 6 and New Mexico'0 7 may be added to this list; the discharge
sanction in these states, however, is subject to the limitation that the
delay must not have been occasioned by the defendant.
At the other end of the scale are those states in which discharge
of the defendant is not a bar to any reprosecution. Only Maryland'08
and Wisconsin' 09 fit into this category.
Between these two categories of absolute discharge and discharge
that is not a bar to any reprosecution lie a number of statutes which
follow a pattern of qualified discharge. In Montana and Oregon,
failure to meet the trial time limits acts as a bar only to misdemeanors,
but does not bar reprosecutions if the original offense is a felony. 10
Arizona, North Carolina, and the federal Speedy Trial Act provide for
discharge either with prejudice (bars reprosecution) or without preju-
dice (no bar to reprosecution). This decision is left to the discretion
of the trial court in the state statutes; in the case of the Speedy Trial
Act, the decision is made by the court in accordance with certain enum-
erated factors."'
We note finally a residual category, containing states with no clear
statutory sanction, and states not following any pattern described pre-
103. Other parts of section 4.1, dealing with joined offenses and waiver of the
speedy trial right, are beyond the scope of this implementation study, which in this final
section is concerned only with the core of section 4.1.
104. ALASKA (CGuM.) R. Cr. 45(g) (1974); COLO. REv. STAT. ANN. § 18-1-405(5)
(1973); FLA. R. CRim. P. 3.19(a)(1) (1972); GA. CODE ANN. § 27-1901.2 (1972);
NEB. REv. STAT. §§ 29-1208 to -1209 (1974); N.Y. CmI. PRO. LAw § 210.20(4)
(McKinney 1975); Omo REV. CODE ANN. §§ 2945.73(b)-(d) (1975); PA. R. CRm. P.
1100 (f) (1975); VA. CODE ANN. § 19.2-243 (1975); WASH. SuPER. Cr. CnM. R. 3.3(f)
(1974).
105. State v. Johnson, 217 N.W.2d 609, 611-12 (Iowa 1974); State v. Bonsante, 112
R.I. 547, 313 A.2d 134 (1973).
106. KAN. STAT. ANN. § 22-3402(1)-(2) (1974).
107. N.M. STAT. ANN. § 41-23-37(d) (Supp. 1975).
108. MD. CODE ANN. art. 27, § 591 (1976).
109. Wis. STAT. ANN. § 971.10(4) (1971).
110. MONT. REv. CODES ANN. § 95-1703(3) (Supp. 1975); ORE. REv. STAT. §
135.753 (1975) (only a bar to reprosecutions of class B or class C misdemeanors; not a
bar to class A misdemeanor, felony reprosecutions).
111. Aiaz. R. CRmI. P. 8.6(b), amending ARiz. R. Cim. P. 8.6(b) (1973)
(dismissal only with prejudice); N.C. GEN. SrAT. § 15A-702(b) (1975); 18 U.S.C. §
3162(a) (Supp. V, 1975).
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viously. In Hawaii, Indiana, New Jersey, and Vermont, a statutory
explanation of "discharge" or "dismissal" is lacking. 12 Rules of court
in the District of Columbia, North Dakota, and Wyoming"' are
patterned after Rule 48(b) of the Federal Rules of Criminal Proce-
dure, and provide for dismissal of the indictment, information, or com-
plaint if there is "unnecessary delay" in presenting the charge or bring-
ing the defendant to trial. To complete this residuum, we note a court
rule in Vermont, 114 different from the one cited above, 15 which pro-
vides for dismissal if the court concludes it "will serve the ends of jus-
tice and the effective administration of the Court's business.""' 6
The statutes and rules in the residual category, typified by Ver-
mont's Rule 48(b)(2), highlight once again the great discretion given
the trial court in determining how speedy a trial will be. We have seen
such discretion in our discussion of the post-1968 implementation of
every key standard, and have even noted discretionary elements among
the standards themselves. Whether implicit in a vague statutory stand-
ard, or explicit on a statute's face, it is this element of judicial discre-
tion, and its tensioned interplay with the various statutory trial time
limits and sanctions for their breach, that is the cutting edge of present-
day implementation of the Speedy Trial Standards. The path that this
cutting edge takes will be critical in revealing the future success of such
implementation.
Conclusion
The Speedy Trial Standards have had little or no impact upon the
speedy trial statutes in 72 percent of the states and the District of
Columbia." 7  And, within the limits of this study, the Standards have
not had a major effect on the case law in these jurisdictions, where
speedy trial rights remain largely governed by pre-Standards law. In
many instances, this law is characterized by the absence of time periods
expressed in terms of days and months, the failure to specify excluded
112. HAwAiI REV. LAWS § 653-3 (1975); IND. R. CGIM. P. 4(B)-(C) (1975); NJ.
(ClM.) R. Or. 3:25-3; VT. R. Cami. P. 48(b) (1).
113. D.C. (ClM.) R. Or. 49(b); N.D. R. CiuM. P. 48(b); Wyo. R. Cam. P.
45(b).
114. VT. R. CRIM. P. 48(b)(2).
115. Id. 48(b)(1).
116. Id. 48(b)(2).
117. This figure is composed of the 54% of the states with pre-1968 statutes (see
notes 60-63 & accompanying text supra) together with the 18% of the states with post-
1968 statutes which reflect little or no consistency with the Speedy Trial Standards. See
notes 60-63, 66 & accompanying text supra.
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periods, the presence of large unfiltered judicial discretion, the demand
rule, the prejudice requirement, the liberal application of the waiver
doctrine, and the failure to use dismissal with prejudice as the sanction
for the violation of the speedy trial right. In the remaining 28 percent
of the states and the federal court system, the Speedy Trial Standards
appear to have had substantial impact. 18 But even in these states, our
study has revealed a wide variation in the adherence to the Standards
as measured by the four chosen key standards.
Thus, in the great majority of American states the Speedy Trial
Standards have yet to make their impact on the nation's statehouses.
In the meantime, the defendant charged with a criminal offense must
rely on the vagaries of the sixth amendment119 to vindicate his right
to a speedy trial.
118. This figure is composed of the states with post-1968 statutes or rules which are
largely consistent with the standards (16%) and those states that we have classified as
"difficult to assess" (12%). See notes 67, 68 & accompanying text supra.
119. See note 24 supra. The sixth amendment speedy trial right is fully discussed
in the literature identified in Appendix B.
Appendix A
The Speedy Trial Standards*
PART L THE TRIAL CALENDAR
1.1 Priorities in scheduling criminal cases.
To effectuate the right of the accused to a speedy trial and the interest of the public
in prompt disposition of criminal cases, insofar as is practicable:
(a) the trial of criminal cases should be given preference over civil cases; and
(b) the trial of defendants in custody and defendants whose pretrial liberty is rea-
sonably believed to present unusual risks should be given preference over other
criminal cases.
1.2 Court control; prosecutor's duty to report.
Control over the trial calendar should be vested in the court. The prosecuting
attorney should be required to file as a public record periodic reports with the court
setting forth the reasons for delay as to each case for which he has not requested
trial within a prescribed time following charging. The prosecuting attorney should
also advise the court of facts relevant in determining the order of cases on the
calendar.
1.3 Continuances.
The court should grant a continuance only upon a showing of good cause and only
for so long as is necessary, taking into account not only the request or consent of
the prosecution or defense, but also the public interest in prompt disposition of the
case.
PART ff. DETERMINING WHAT IS A SPEEDY TRIAL
2.1 Speedy trial time limits.
A defendant's right to speedy trial should be expressed by rule or statute in terms
of days or months running from a specified event. Certain periods of necessary
delay should be excluded in computing the time for trial, and these should be spe-
cifically identified by rule or statute insofar as is practicable.
2.2 When time commences to run.
The time for trial should commence running, without demand by the defendant, as
follows:
(a) from the date the charge is filed, except that if the defendant has been con-
tinuously held in custody or on bail or recognizance until that date to answer for the
same crime or a crime based on the same conduct or arising from the same criminal
* Reprinted by permission of the American Bar Association. Copies of the
Approved Draft of the ABA Standards Relating to Speedy Trial including extensive
commentary are available for $3.75 from the ABA Section of Criminal Justice, 1800
M Street, NW, Washington, D.C. 20036.
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episode, then the time for trial should commence running from the date he was held
to answer;
(b) if the charge was dismissed upon motion of the defendant and thereafter the
defendant was held to answer or charged with an offense, from the date the defendant
was so held to answer or charged, as above; or
(c) if the defendant is to be tried again following a mistrial, an order for a new
trial, or an appeal or collateral attack, from the date of the mistrial, order granting
a new trial, or remand.
2.3 Excluded periods.
The following periods should be excluded in computing the time for trial:
(a) The period of delay resulting from other proceedings concerning the defendant,
including but not limited to an examination and hearing on competency and the
period during which he is incompetent to stand trial, hearings on pretrial motions,
interlocutory appeals, and trial of other charges.
(b) The period of delay resulting from congestion of the trial docket when the
congestion is attributable to exceptional circumstances.
(c) The period of delay resulting from a continuance granted at the request or
with the consent of the defendant or his counsel. A defendant without counsel should
not be deemed to have consented to a continuance unless he has been advised by the
court of his right to a speedy trial and the effect of his consent.
(d) The period of delay resulting from a continuance granted at the request of the
prosecuting attorney, if:
(i) the continuance is granted because of the unavailability of evidence material
to the state's case, when the prosecuting attorney has exercised due diligence to
obtain such evidence and there are reasonable grounds to believe that such evidence
will be available at the later date; or
(ii) the continuance is granted to allow the prosecuting attorney additional time
to prepare the state's case and additional time is justified because of the exceptional
circumstances of the case.
(e) The period of delay resulting from the absence or unavailability of the defend-
ant. A defendant should be considered absent whenever his whereabouts are un-
known and in addition he is attempting to avoid apprehension or prosecution or his
whereabouts cannot be determined by due diligence. A defendant should be consid-
ered unavailable whenever his whereabouts are known but his presence for trial cannot
be obtained or he resists being returned to the state for trial.
(f) If the charge was dismissed upon motion of the prosecuting attorney and
thereafter a charge is filed against the defendant for the same offense or an offense
required to be joined with that offense, the period of delay from the date the chargd
was dismissed to the date the time limitations would commence running as to the
subsequent charge had there been no previous charge.
(g) A reasonable period of delay when the defendant is joined for trial with a
codefendant as to whom the time for trial has not run and there is good cause for not
granting a severance. In all other cases the defendant should be granted a severance
so that he may be tried within the time limits applicable to him.
(h) Other periods of delay for good cause.
PART III SPECIAL PROCEDURES: PERSON SERVING
TERM OF IMPRISONMENT
3.1 Prosecutor's obligations; notice to and availability of prisoner.
To protect the right to speedy trial of a person serving a term of imprisonment
either within or without the jurisdiction, it should be provided by rule or statute and,
where necessary, interstate compact, that:
(a) If the prosecuting attorney knows that a person charged with a criminal of-
fense is serving a term of imprisonment in a penal institution of that or another
jurisdiction, he must promptly:
(i) undertake to obtain the presence of the prisoner for trial; or
(ii) cause a detainer to be filed with the official having custody of the prisoner
and request him to so advise the prisoner and to advise the prisoner of his right to
demand trial.
(b) If an official having custody of such a prisoner receives a detainer, he must
promptly advise the prisoner of the charge and of the prisoner's right to demand
trial. If at any time thereafter the prisoner informs such official that he does demand
trial, the official shall cause a certificate to that effect to be sent promptly to the
prosecuting attorney who caused the detainer to be filed.
(c) Upon receipt of such certificate, the prosecuting attorney must promptly seek
to obtain the presence of the prisoner for trial.
(d) When the official having custody of the prisoner receives from the prosecuting
attorney a properly supported request for temporary custody of such prisoner for
trial, the prisoner shall be made available to that prosecuting attorney (subject, in
cases of interjurisdictional transfer, to the traditional right of the executive to refuse
transfer and the right of the prisoner to contest the legality of his delivery).
3.2 Computation of time.
The time for trial of a prisoner whose presence for trial has been obtained while he
is serving a term of imprisonment should commence running from the time his pres-
ence for trial has been obtained, subject to all the excluded periods listed in section
2.3. If the prosecuting attorney has unreasonably delayed (i) causing a detainer to
be filed with the custodial official, or (ii) seeking to obtain the prisoner's presence
for trial in lieu of filing a detainer or upon receipt of a certificate of demand, such
periods of unreasonable delay should also be counted in ascertaining whether the
time for trial has run.
PART IV. CONSEQUENCES OF DENIAL OF SPEEDY TRIAL
4.1 Absolute discharge.
If a defendant is not brought to trial before the running of the time for trial, as
extended by excluded periods, the consequence should be absolute discharge. Such
discharge should forever bar prosecution for the offense charged and for any other
offense required to be joined with that offense. Failure of the defendant or his
counsel to move for discharge prior to trial or entry of a plea of guilty should consti-
tute waiver of the right to speedy trial.
4.2 Release on recognizance.
If a shorter time limitation is applicable to defendants held in custody, the running
of this time should only require release of such a defendant on his own recognizance.
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